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Comments I
Slow and Steady Wins the Race: Lessons
Learned, and Why it is Time to Establish a
Corporate Legal Advice Privilege
Matthew M. Cronin*
I. Introduction
The legal advice privilege has been shaped and reshaped at different
times by different legal systems, but the underlying premise remains
intact. As the methods of managing one's legal affairs have changed and
grown increasingly complex, so has the legal advice privilege.
In much of the world, clients are no longer strictly individuals who
seek legal advice to protect their interests. The legal advice privilege has
evolved to protect a variety of legal "persons," such as business
organizations. However, the privilege is not shared and belongs only to
one particular client in any particular matter. That client alone may
assert or waive the privilege.
This Comment identifies policy considerations that give rise to
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difficulties in application of the legal advice privilege in the United
Kingdom, and its counterpart in the United States, the attorney-client
privilege. Part I discusses the evolution of the legal advice privilege, as
well as its existence and application in the corporate context. Part II
addresses the evolution of the attorney-client privilege and difficulties
encountered in applying it consistently to corporate clients. Part III
compares the corporate legal advice privilege and the corporate attorney-
client privilege, outlines the policies underlying each approach, and
explains how both government investigators and corporate clients can
benefit from clear recognition, and consistent application, of the
corporate legal advice privilege.
II. Legal Advice Privilege in the United Kingdom
The legal advice privilege has maintained an enduring presence in
some form or another in the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom for
centuries.' In his judgment in Three Rivers District Council and others
v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England ("Three Rivers (No.
6)"), 2 a case, which will be more thoroughly discussed infra, Lord Scott
identified several features that underlie the policy reasons for the legal
advice privilege.3 Lord Scott noted that the legal advice privilege gives
the person entitled to it the right to decline to disclose or to allow
disclosure of the confidential communication or document in question.4
Such an entitlement does not arise unless the communication or
document for which privilege is sought is a confidential one; and if the
communication or document qualifies for the privilege, the privilege is
absolute.5
A. Scope of the Legal Advice Privilege in the United Kingdom
Until 1833, the courts recognized only one privilege, the legal
professionals privilege, which protected communications between lawyer
and client in connection with pending litigation.6 In 1833, however,
1. See Minter v. Priest, (1930) [1930] A.C. 558 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.);
Great Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co., (1981) [1981] 2 All E.R. 485,
[1981] 1 W.L.R. 529; Wheeler v. Le Marchant, (1881) 17 Ch. D. 675 (Ch. D.);
Greenough and Others v. Gaskell, (1833) [1824-1834] All E.R. 767, 1 My & K 98, 101-
02 (Rev. Rep.).
2. Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England
(No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter




6. Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England
(No. 5), (2003) [2003] EWCA (Civ) 474, [2003] Q.B. 1556, 8 [hereinafter Three Rivers
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Lord Brougham extended the privilege to communications where
litigation was not contemplated:
To force from the party himself the production of communications
made by him to professional men, seems inconsistent with the
possibility of an ignorant man safely resorting to professional
advice.., the protection would be insufficient, if it only included
communications more or less connected with judicial proceedings:
for a person oftentimes requires the aid of professional advice upon
the subject of his rights and liabilities, with no reference to any
particular litigation, and without any other reference to litigation
generally than all human affairs have, in so far as every transaction
may, by possibility, become the subject ofjudicial inquiry.
7
Although the exact terminology had not yet been articulated, in so
stating, Lord Brougham partitioned the legal professionals privilege into
two related, but distinct privileges: the "legal advice privilege," and the
"litigation privilege." The litigation privilege protects evidence obtained
for the purpose of litigation,8 and the legal advice privilege "attaches to
advice upon the subject of a client's rights and liabilities" 9 without any
other reference to litigation. The House of Lords recently emphasized
the distinct nature of the two privileges and defined the scope of the legal
advice privilege in Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and
Company of the Bank of England (No. 6).10 The complex nature of the
proceedings leading to this decision requires a short summary.
B. The Three Rivers Cases
The Bank of England ("the Bank") maintains regulatory authority
over banks and financial institutions doing business in the United
Kingdom. 1 Following the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International ("BCCI") in 1991, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
announced the creation of the independent Bingham Inquiry Unit
("BIU"), consisting of three Bank officials.' 2  Their task was "[tlo
enquire into the supervision of BCCI under the Banking Acts; to
consider whether the action taken by all the UK authorities was
(No. 5)].
7. Greenough, [1824-1834] All E.R. 767 (Rev. Rep.).
8. See generally Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, (1876) 2 Ch.D. 644
(appeal taken from Eng.) (discussing the litigation privilege).
9. Greenough, [1824-1834] All E.R. 767 (Rev. Rep.).
10. See Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
11. See Banking Act, 1979 (Eng.); Banking Act, 1987 (Eng.).
12. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, at 5 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
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appropriate and timely; and to make recommendations."' 3 The Bank
hired Freshfields, a London-based law firm, to advise the BIU generally
on all of the Bank's dealings, and Freshfields retained counsel to assist in
that process.'
4
1. Three Rivers (No. 5)
Following the publication of the Bingham Inquiry's Report on
October 22, 1992, the Three Rivers District Council ("the Council") and
others sued the Bank to recover losses incurred from the collapse of
BCCI.' 5  In 2002, the Council requested documents created by
employees of the Bank during the course of the inquiry, which were
meant to be passed to Freshfields. 16 The Bank claimed that it had the
right to withhold the documents on the grounds of the legal advice
privilege.' 7 The trial court held that the documents were privileged 18 and
the Council appealed.' 9
The Court of Appeal narrowly construed the legal advice privilege
holding that:
The 19 th century authorities established that legal advice privilege
was a well established category of legal professional privilege, but
that such privilege could not be claimed for documents other than
those passing between the client and his legal advisers and evidence
of the contents of such communications.
20
Significantly, the Court of Appeal also addressed the question of who
can properly be considered the client.2' As a preliminary matter, the
court noted third party material is not protected by the legal advice
privilege.22 The court did, however, recognize that a corporation can
only act through its employees, who are not to be treated as third parties
for the purposes of privilege.23 The court ultimately held that the legal
advice privilege was not available to protect the documents in question





17. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, 8 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
18. See Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (No. 5), (2002) [2002] EWHC 2730.
19. See Three Rivers (No. 5), (2003) [2003] EWCA (Civ) 474, [2003] Q.B. 1556.
20. Id. 21.
21. Id. 31.
22. See Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, at 46 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
23. See id.
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to obtain legal advice.24 Instead, they were prepared for communication
to the BIU, and the BIU is the client.25 The Bank appealed to the House
of Lords and leave was denied.26
2. Three Rivers (No. 6)
Following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Three Rivers (No.
5), the Council renewed its request for documents, and the Bank once
again claimed privilege.27 The trial court ordered disclosure of those
documents that were not inconsistent with the declaration of the Court of
Appeal in Three Rivers (No. 5).28 The Bank appealed and the appeal was
dismissed.29
The judgment dismissing the appeal did not address the existence of
a corporate legal advice privilege. The House of Lords granted leave to
appeal on the narrow issue, "whether the communications between the
BIU and Freshfields or counsel relating to the Inquiry are protected by
the legal advice privilege. 30
On appeal, the House of Lords reexamined the scope of the legal
advice privilege and unanimously overruled the Court of Appeal.31 In
his judgment, Lord Scott stated that the "[l]egal advice privilege should,
in my opinion, be given a scope that reflects the policy reasons that
justify its presence in our law."32 The House of Lords took an approach
that had been criticized by the Court of Appeal in Three Rivers (No. 5)33
by adopting the language of Balabel v. Air India.34 The House of Lords
held "legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it must
include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the
relevant legal context. 35 The judgments of all five Law Lords rejected
invitations to comment on the Court of Appeal's decision in Three Rivers
24. Id. 37.
25. Three Rivers (No. 5), (2003) [2003] EWCA (Civ) 474, [2003] Q.B. 1556, at T
31.
26. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, at 15 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
27. Id. 16.
28. Id. T 18.
29. See Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (No. 6), (2004) [2004] EWCA (Civ) 218, [2004] Q.B. 916.
30. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, at 20 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
31. See id.
32. Id. T 35.
33. Three Rivers (No. 5), (2003) [2003] EWCA (Civ) 474, [2003] Q.B. 1556, at
7 30-31.
34. Balabel v. Air India, [1988] 1 Ch. 317, 330 (1988).
35. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKIL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, 38 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (quoting id.).
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(No. 5) 36 -that the BIU could be regarded as the client.37 As a result,
Three Rivers (No. 5) remains the guiding precedent on the existence of a
corporate privilege, and the operation of the privilege is plagued by
uncertainty.
38
C. An Evaluation of the Current Treatment of the Legal Advice
Privilege
In reaching this conclusion, but refusing to overrule the Court of
Appeal's recognition of the privilege as applicable to the BIU, the House
of Lords answered some questions related to the scope of the privilege,
but left several others unresolved.
1. What is a "Relevant Legal Context"?
The privilege protects communications between a lawyer in his
professional capacity and his client, but only if the communications are
confidential and were initiated for the purposes of seeking or giving legal
advice. 39 Lord Scott recognized there was no way of avoiding difficulty
"when deciding, in marginal cases, whether the seeking of advice from
or the giving of advice by lawyers does or does not take place in a
relevant legal context so as to attract legal advice privilege. 40 In cases
of doubt, the judge called upon to make the decision should ask, "[i]s the
occasion on which the communication takes place and is the purpose for
which it takes place such as to make it reasonable to expect the privilege
to apply?",41 Unfortunately, the Law Lords did not address whether
confidential communications between corporate clients and their lawyers
for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice is a relevant legal
context.
2. Who is the "Client"?
In Three Rivers (No. 5) the Court of Appeal held that
communications between the lawyers and third parties were not
36. See id.
37. Three Rivers (No. 5), (2003) [2003] EWCA (Civ) 474, [2003] Q.B. 1556, at
31.
38. Joan Loughrey, Legal Advice Privilege and the Corporate Client, 9 IJEP 183,
183 (2005) (considering question of which corporate communications attract legal advice
privilege).
39. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS BERINGER, LEGAL ADVICE PRIVILEGE: HOUSE OF
LORDS CLARIFIES POSITION (2004), www.freshfields.com/practice/disputeresolution/
publications/pdfs/1 0059.pdf.
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protected;42 only communications between Freshfields and the BIU could
qualify.43 The BIU consisted of three people, all of whom were
considered the client because the BIU was established to deal with
inquiries and to seek and receive Freshfields' advice. 4
On the other hand, certain officers and employees of the corporate
client were considered third parties.45 Unfortunately, the Court of
Appeal did not express any opinion about how many individuals, or
which individuals, may comprise the client under other circumstances.
D. Practical Considerations Implicit in Identifying the "Client"
The Court of Appeal gave no guidance on the privilege's practical
application in the corporate context. But because corporations can act
only through their agents, it is important to define who the client is for
the purposes of seeking and receiving advice at a very early stage. 6
Under the current regime, the only avenue available to corporations
is to nominate and document at the outset which employees are to be
considered the client.47 Also, "care needs to be taken to ensure that only
the client deals with the lawyers. To increase the chances that
communications will be protected, it is also important to give careful
consideration to the system by which relevant information is collected.49
The client must be aware that any information prepared for the lawyers
by third parties will not be subject to privilege.50  No documents
containing information relevant to the seeking of legal advice should be
created without approval from the client, and such documents should
never be copied to anybody other than the client.'
Close attention to the evolving application of the attorney-client
privilege in the United States can serve as a tool to guide government
authorities and corporations in the United Kingdom when evaluating
whether to change the current approach and what the next step should be.
III. The Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States




45. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, 31 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).






51. See PINSENT MASONS, supra note 46.
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oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications. '52 The
common law justification for the attorney-client privilege is the notion
that "permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a
public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing
all rational means for ascertaining the truth."53
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court promulgated the Federal
Rules of Evidence setting forth specific categories of privileges,
including an attorney-client privilege.54 Congress chose not to adopt
various privilege rules as promulgated by the Supreme Court, but rather
adopted a general rule allowing the federal courts to establish privilege in
light of the common law. 55 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states: "the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. 56
Today, the generally accepted purpose of the privilege is to
encourage "full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interest in the observance of
law and the administration of justice.57 . . . The privilege recognizes that
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed
by the client., 58 Although originally recognized as a privilege vested in
natural humans, the attorney-client privilege has now been extended to a
variety of legal entities.59
A. Corporate Criminal Liability
It was not until 1962 that federal courts in the United States began
to formally recognize that a corporation may be held criminally liable for
the acts of its agents. 60 All that is required is that an agent act within the
scope of its employment, and that such an act benefit the corporation,
even if the benefit is slight.6' In the intervening years, the scope of
corporate criminal liability was expanded to the point that liability
became the rule, not the exception.62 As a result, once corporate counsel
52. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
53. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 (8d Cir. 1997).
54. See generally FED. R. EVID.
55. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 928.
56. FED. R. EVID. 501.
57. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
61. Id. at 127.
62. See Lance Cole, Corporate Criminal Liability in the 211 Century: A New Era?,
45 S. TEX. L. REV. 147, 148-50 (2003) (discussing new laws and law enforcement
[Vol. 26:4
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was made aware of questionable behavior by agents of the corporation,
internal investigations were often initiated.63 Government investigators
frequently requested the results of such internal investigations, which led
to complications in the application of the attorney-client privilege.
64
B. Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
In 1981, the Supreme Court, in its ruling in Upjohn Co. v. United
States,65 recognized that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving
of professional advice to those who can act on it, but also the sharing of
information with the lawyer to enable her to give sound and informed
advice.66 Therefore, the Court extended the protection of the attorney-
client privilege to the corporate form. 6 7  The Court pointed out that
protecting against compelled disclosure communications made by
corporate employees to corporate counsel in an effort to secure legal
advice for the corporation is "[c]onsistent with the underlying purposes
,,68of the attorney-client privilege.'
C. U.S. Government's Approach to Criminal Prosecution of
Corporations
Increased attention to corporate behavior by the U.S. Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and regulatory bodies such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission, as well as the perceived increase in requests by
the DOJ for waiver of the corporate attomey-client privilege have led
many commentators to fear that the privilege is being eroded. 69  In
response, however, it was contended that the DOJ's consideration of
waiver was based squarely on the definition of "cooperation" set forth in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations ("Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines").7 °
policies that have altered rules of game for counsel defending white-collar criminal cases
involving corporations and securities law violations).
63. Cf. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
64. Id. at 389.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 390.
67. See id.
68. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394.
69. See, e.g., generally Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law
Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is
Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv. 469 (2003) (discussing federal government's policy of
encouraging corporate cooperation with government investigations).
70. See, e.g., generally Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business
Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587 (2004)
(discussing how privilege waivers impact DOJ's assessment of cooperation, while
addressing its most frequent criticisms).
2008]
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1. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
In 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission enacted the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines after several years of critical
discussion. The introductory commentary to Chapter Eight of the 2005
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines stated that the guidelines were
"designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their
agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence,
and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for
preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.
' 7'
Subsequent provisions suggested that timely and thorough
cooperation by a corporation under government investigation should be
grounds for reducing a sentence after conviction:
To be timely, the cooperation must begin essentially at the same time
as the organization is officially notified of a criminal investigation.
To be thorough, the cooperation should include the disclosure of all
pertinent information known by the organization... However, the
cooperation to be measured is the cooperation of the organization
itself, not the cooperation of individuals within the organization....
Waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product protections is
not a prerequisite to a reduction ... unless such waiver is necessary
in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent
information known to the organization. 7
The DOJ has followed the lead of the U.S. Sentencing Commission by
putting its rationale into effect in the pre-conviction phase of criminal
prosecution.73
2. The Department of Justice
In 1999, then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a
memorandum 74 ("Holder Memo"), which provided guidance to federal
prosecutors in deciding whether to charge a business organization with
an offense. In 2003, then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson
issued a revised version of the Holder Memo ("Thompson Memo").75 A
feeling of necessity to revise the Holder Memo was the result of limited
resources that resulted from law enforcement's response to the terrorist
71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8Al.1 (2005).
72. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. n.12 (emphasis added).
73. See Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Eric H. Holder, Deputy Attorney
General, to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (on file with author).
74. See id.
75. See Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Larry D. Thompson, Deputy
Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components & U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20,
2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
[Vol. 26:4
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attacks of September 11, 2001, a series of corporate scandals, and the
meltdown of the market cap of prominent corporations and significant
losses by their investors.76
The main focus of the Thompson Memo's revisions was an
"increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a
corporation's cooperation.",77  Not unlike the Holder Memo, the
Thompson Memo provided a loose analytical framework contained in "a
number of general principles, with accompanying commentary." 78  It
encouraged prosecutors to weigh all of the factors normally considered in
the sound exercise of prosecutorial judgment: "the sufficiency of the
evidence; the likelihood of success at trial; the probable deterrent,
rehabilitative, and other consequences of conviction; and the adequacy of
non-criminal approaches., 79  But due to the nature of the corporate
"person," the Thompson Memo set forth nine additional considerations
to be taken into account.8°
Commentary to the fourth factor-that the corporation's timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in
the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of
corporate attorney-client and work-product protection--emphasized that
a waiver of attorney-client privilege, both with respect to its internal
investigation and to communications between specific officers, directors,
and employees and counsel, should be considered in evaluating the
76. Larry D. Thompson, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in White-Collar
Prosecutions, Speech at the Heritage Foundation, Nov. 30, 2006, available at
www.heritage.org/Press/Events/archive.cfm?startdate= 12/31/2006&days=364.
77. See id.
78. Sean R. Berry, Revised Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business
Organizations: An Overview, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' BULLETIN, Nov. 2003, at 5.
79. Thompson, supra note 75, at pt. II.A (citing USAM § 9-27.220).
80. Id. (stating that prosecutors should consider the following factors in reaching a
decision as to the proper treatment of a corporate target: (1) the nature and seriousness of
the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies and
priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of
crime; (2) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management; (3) the
corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory
enforcement actions against it; (4) the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including,
ifnecessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work-product protection; (5) the
existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program; (6) the corporation's
remedial action's, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance
program or to improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline
or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant
government agencies; (7) collateral consequences, including any disproportionate harm to
shareholders, pension holders and employees not proven personally culpable and impact
on the public arising from the prosecution; (8) the adequacy of the prosecution of
individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance; and (9) the adequacy of
remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions).
2008]
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completeness of a corporation's disclosure. 81 Buried in a footnote to the
Thompson Memo, however, was the direction, "[e]xcept in unusual
circumstances, prosecutors should not seek a waiver with respect to
communications and work product related to advice concerning the
government's criminal investigation.
82
As pointed out above, the policy of encouraging corporate
cooperation with government investigations was first formally articulated
by the Holder Memo. It has been argued, however, that changes in the
corporate culture required a new emphasis on corporate cooperation.83
This shift has led to increased requests for corporations to waive their
attorney-client privilege,84 as well as to the increased popularity of
deferred prosecution agreements.
85
In essence, deferred prosecution agreements create a contractual
relationship between the DOJ and the corporation being investigated. In
exchange for, inter alia, voluntary disclosure of information revealed
during the course of corporate internal investigations, and the pledge of
continued cooperation with the government investigation, the DOJ
agrees not to prosecute the corporation for a specified time period and to
86drop all charges upon expiration of the agreement.
"Failure to disclose to the government the results of an internal
investigation and waive attorney-client privilege.., is deemed evidence
of less-than-authentic cooperation. 87 Therefore, corporations are faced
with a very difficult decision: do they assert the privilege and risk
indictment, or do they waive the privilege in exchange for leniency? An
indictment can have devastating consequences on an organization,
potentially eliminating the ability of the organization to survive post-
indictment or to dispute the charges against it at trial.88
Opponents to the DOJ's policy have suggested that the DOJ is
contemptuous of legal privilege.89 More specifically, some critics have
81. Id. at pt. VI.B.
82. Id. at pt. VI.B n.3.
83. Thompson, supra note 75.
84. See AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT (2005), available at http://www.acc.com/
Surveys/attyclient2.pdf
85. Thompson, supra note 75.
86. See, e.g., DAVID N. KELLEY, KPMG DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT (Aug.
25, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf.
87. George J. Terwilliger & Darryl S. Lew, Privilege in Peril: Corporate
Cooperation in the New Era of Government Investigations, ENGAGE: THE J. OF THE
FEDERALIST SOC'Y's PRAC. GROUPS, March 2006, at 25, 26.
88. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, § 2(a)(7) (2006), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/attomeyclient-privilege-
protection .act 12 6 06 -hen06g74_xml.pdf (legislation never introduced).
89. White Collar Enforcement (Part) I: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate
Waivers, Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Robert D.
[Vol. 26:4
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opposed the DOJ's "routine" practice of seeking to obtain waivers9°
despite the Thompson Memo's clear directive not to seek waiver
"[e]xcept in unusual circumstances. ' 9 Indeed, some feared the very
basis of the adversarial process was being undermined.9 2
In response to such criticism, in 2005, then-Acting Deputy Attorney
General Robert McCallum issued a memo ("McCallum Memo")
93
requiring each U.S. Attorney's Office to institute a written waiver review
policy that facilitated supervisory approval before seeking a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege. 94  Even though the McCallum Memo
imposed additional procedural requirements upon federal prosecutors, it
nevertheless continued to endorse the practice of seeking waivers as an
exercise of appropriate prosecutorial discretion. 95  Critics of the new
policy recognized that, although well-intentioned, the McCallum Memo
"likely will result in numerous different waiver policies being established
throughout the country, many of which may impose only token restraints
on the ability of prosecutors to demand waiver."
96
D. Recent Developments in Treatment of Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege
Despite the rapid succession of changes in DOJ policy, there has
recently been a wave of further developments that will have a significant
impact on the future of the attorney-client relationship in white-collar
prosecution.
McCallum, Jr., Associate Att'y Gen. of the United States), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/mccallum030706.pdf.
90. See generally ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Recommendation
111 (2005), available at www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient (supporting the
preservation of attorney-client privilege as essential to maintaining confidential
relationship between client and attorney).
91. Thompson, supra note 75, at pt. VI.B n.3.
92. See generally Earl J. Silbert, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of
Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1225
(2006) (discussing impact of corporate waivers on adversarial system).
93. Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting
Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components & U.S. Attorneys (Oct.
21, 2005), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/
AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf.
94. See id.
95. Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission Public Meeting Regarding Chapter
Eight Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege & Work Product Protections (2005) (statement
of Dick Thornburgh), available at www.ussc.gov/corp/11 15 05/Thornburgh.pdf#
search=%22McCallum%20Memo%22 (adhering to the principles of the Thompson
Memo).
96. Letter from Griffin B. Bell, Former Att'y Gen., et al., to Alberto Gonzalez, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.acca.com/public/
attyclientpriv/agsept52006.pdf.
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1. Amendment of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
On April 5, 2006, after holding several public hearings, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission voted to promulgate an amendment deleting
commentary to the organizational sentencing guidelines.97  The
amendment has eliminated any mention of waiver of attorney-client
privilege as a pre-requisite for an organization to receive credit for
cooperation at sentencing, but leaves all other relevant language
untouched.98 Deletion of this language left the DOJ with no legal
foundation to stand on aside from its own prior practice. The DOJ's
policy was weakened further by Congress's recent involvement in the
discussion.
2. Legislation
During November 2006, United States Senator Arlen Specter
signaled he was prepared to introduce the "Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act of 2006" 9' for consideration to the United States
Senate. 00 The purpose of this legislation was to "place on each agency
clear and practical limits designed to preserve the attorney-client
privilege.., available to an organization and preserve the constitutional
rights and other legal protections available to employees of such an
organization.'
01
Enactment of the legislation would have prohibited any agent or
attorney of the United States from demanding, requesting, or
conditioning treatment of the corporation on the disclosure of any
communication protected by the attorney-client privilege. 0 2  The
legislation would also have prohibited agents or attorneys of the United
States from considering any valid assertion of the attorney-client
privilege in making charging decisions or determining the organization's
level of cooperation.' °3  Enactment of this legislation would have
97. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing Commission
Votes to Amend Guidelines for Terrorism, Firearms, and Steroids (April 11, 2006),
available at www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0406.htm.
98. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5, cmt. n. 12 (2006).
99. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006 (2006), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/attomeyclient-privilege-pr
otection act 12 6 06 hen06g74_xml.pdf (legislation never introduced).
100. Carrie Johnson, Shift in Corporate Prosecution Ahead: Government to Stiffen
Rules on Indicting Companies, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2006, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/29/AR2006112
90131 6.html.
101. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, § 2(b).
102. Id. § 3(a).
103. Id.
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federalized the corporate attorney-client privilege, 10 4 a proposition that
would have resulted in the DOJ having its own policy dictated to it by
Congress. Senator Specter chose not to introduce the legislation,
presumably because of the DOJ's subsequent revision of the Thompson
Memo.
3. The McNulty Memo
No longer able to rely on the precedent set by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, and amidst criticism from the defense bar, 10 5 industry
members, 10 6 former high-ranking DOJ officials,'0 7 and Congress, 0 8 the
DOJ has once again changed its policy of considering waiver of attorney-
client privilege in charging decisions. 10 9 On December 12, 2006, Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty released revisions to the Thompson
Memo" 0 ("McNulty Memo").
The McNulty Memo makes clear that waiver of attorney-client
protections is not a prerequisite to a finding that a company has
cooperated in the government's investigation.'" The McNulty Memo
adopted a tiered approach detailing when a prosecutor may request that a
corporation provide protected materials. 1 2 Under the current regime,
prosecutors may only request waiver of attorney-client protections when
there is a legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their
law enforcement obligations.' 1 3 "If a legitimate need exists, prosecutors
should seek the least intrusive waiver necessary to conduct a complete
and thorough investigation, and should follow a step-by-step approach to
requesting information."
' 14
It is important to note that the privilege only protects disclosure of
communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by
104. See id.
105. See ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Recommendation 111, supra
note 90.
106. See Am. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 84.
107. See Letter from Griffin B. Bell, et al., to Alberto Gonzalez, supra note 96.
108. See generally Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006 (2006), available
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/attorneyclient pivilege
_protection act_12 6 06 henO6g74_xml.pdf (legislation never introduced).
109. Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney
General, to Heads of Department Components & United States Attorneys (Dec. 12,






114. McNulty, supra note 109, at IV.B.2.
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those who communicated with the attorney.' l5 For instance, "[t]he client
cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'What did you say or write
to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within
his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such into
his communication to his attorney." ' 16 For that reason, the McNulty
Memo has created two categories of information relating to the
underlying misconduct.''
7
Category I includes purely factual information, which may or may
not be privileged. 1 8  Before requesting a waiver for Category I
information, prosecutors must obtain written authorization from the
United States Attorney." 9  "A corporation's response to the
government's request for waiver of privileged Category I information
may be considered in determining whether a corporation has cooperated
in the government's investigation.' 2 °
Category II includes attorney-client communications, and may be
requested only if the purely factual information provides an incomplete
basis to conduct a thorough investigation.'12 Before requesting a waiver
for Category II information, the United States Attorney must obtain
written authorization from the Deputy Attorney General. 12 2  "If a
corporation declines to provide a waiver for Category II information after
a written request from the United States Attorney, prosecutors must not
consider this declination against the corporation in making a charging
decision."'
123
The McNulty Memo represents the DOJ's current approach to
requesting waivers. It has overruled the McCallum Memo, and has made
significant changes to the Thompson and Holder Memos, while still
allowing for waiver requests under certain circumstances. Furthermore,
by adopting a tiered approach that distinguishes between attorney-client
communications and factual information underlying the misconduct, the
DOJ is likely attempting to insulate its policy from attack on
constitutional grounds.
IV. Crafting an Effective Corporate Legal Advice Privilege
It is evident that uncertainty in particular aspects of the corporate
115. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395.
116. Id. at 396 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F. Supp.
830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).





122. McNulty, supra note 109, at IV.B.2.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
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privilege is not limited to the experience of the United Kingdom.
Corporate clients doing business in the United States have experienced
problems of their own. Many of the difficulties experienced by U.S.
corporations, and foreign corporations in the United States, can serve as
guidance for policy makers in the United Kingdom grappling with the
task of defining the corporate legal advice privilege.
A. Common Justification
Although the corporate legal advice privilege and the corporate
attorney-client privilege are at different stages in their development, they
share a common foundation. Lord Scott, in his judgment for the House
of Lords in Three Rivers (No. 6), cited several cases within and without
the United Kingdom discussing, in dicta, the justification for the
privilege as applied to individual clients. 124 Scott noted that the common
idea in all of the cited cases is that:
It is necessary in our society, a society in which the restraining and
controlling framework is built upon a belief in the rule of law, that
communications between clients and lawyers, whereby the clients are
hoping for the assistance of the lawyers' legal skills in the
management of their (the clients') affairs, should be secure against
the possibility of any scrutiny from others, whether the police, the
executive, business competitors, inquisitive busy-bodies or anyone
else. 125
As this statement indicates, the most fundamental policy shared by the
legal advice privilege and the attorney-client privilege is that all clients
should be able to seek advice from their lawyers without being subjected
to scrutiny by others. If the legal advice privilege is to be given a scope
that reflects the policy reasons that justify its presence in the law of the
United Kingdom, it must be made available to communications between
corporate clients and their lawyers.
Once it is conceded that corporate and individual clients are equally
entitled to the advice of diligent counsel, there is no logical reason to
restrict the privilege only to individual clients. As discussed supra, this
premise was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v.
United States ("Upjohn"). In fact, it was one of the cases cited by Lord
124. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. 383; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Jones v
Smith [1999] 1 SCR 455; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v West-Walker [1954]
NZLR 191; In R (on the application of Morgan Grenfell Ltd) v Special Commissioner of
Income Tax [2003] AC 563; B v Auckland District Law Society [2003] 2 AC 736 at 757;
and A M & S Europe Ltd v European Commission [1983] 1 All ER 705 at 913; Balabel v
Air India [1988] Ch. 317.
125. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, at 34 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
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Scott in support of the proposition above. Although acknowledging that
Upjohn constitutes a valuable authority in a common law jurisdiction,
Scott went on to comment, "whether (or to what extent) the principles
there expressed should be accepted and applied in [the United Kingdom]
is debatable."
' 126
B. Competing Policies Underlying Recognition of the Corporate
Privilege
In addition to recognizing that all clients are entitled to the advice of
diligent counsel, other interests must be taken into account when
evaluating the need for a corporate privilege, including: (1) fostering
corporate self-policing and facilitating corporate compliance with the
law; and (2) facilitating reasonable government enforcement.127 The
challenge is to accomplish these goals without sacrificing the core
principles and protections of the legal advice privilege.1 28 Recognition of
the privilege in the corporate context can, however, serve to accomplish
these important goals.
C. Reconciling Competing Policies
Clarity and consistency are the keys to creating a workable
corporate legal advice privilege that benefits the interests of both
corporate clients and government investigators. Clearly recognizing a
corporate privilege, establishing its boundaries, and providing guidance
on its consistent application would encourage corporations to create
effective compliance programs, as well as allow corporate clients and
their lawyers to interact in confidence. Additionally, clear recognition of
the corporate privilege and its consistent application would foster
corporate cooperation and minimize the expense of investigation.
1. Fostering Corporate Self-Policing and Facilitating Corporate
Compliance with the Law
In the United Kingdom, corporate clients cannot be certain that any
information they collect during internal investigations will be
protected.129 This may result in reluctance on the part of corporations to
create comprehensive compliance programs, or to aggressively utilize
them. Consistent application of a corporate privilege would provide
incentive for corporations to create effective compliance programs and to
126. Id. 47.
127. Terwilliger & Lew, supra note 87, at 25.
128. Id.
129. PINSENT MASONS, supra note 46.
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conduct comprehensive internal investigations.
130
If corporate clients are unsure whether information shared with their
lawyers will be subject to disclosure, they will be hesitant to aggressively
police the behavior of their agents. On the other hand, if corporate
clients are secure in the knowledge that privileged information will be
protected, then they are more likely to create strong, reliable compliance
programs. Such programs would be more effective in ferreting out
misconduct, thereby facilitating corporate compliance with the law.
In crafting guidance for the application of a corporate privilege, the
United Kingdom can learn from the experience of corporate clients in the
United States. Historically, corporate clients in the United States have
been uncertain whether they will be compelled to disclose the results of
internal investigations. Once the government initiated an investigation,
corporate clients were often faced with the difficult decision whether to
assert the privilege and risk indictment or waive the privilege and turn
over the results of internal investigations in exchange for leniency.'
31
Furthermore, until the recent release of the McNulty Memo, the DOJ's
policy of encouraging corporate cooperation through waiver requests was
open-ended. Large corporations that did business in multiple federal
districts were often subject to differing waiver request policies. 32 It has
been argued that this inconsistency in application has chilled
communications between corporate clients and their lawyers.'
33
Recognition of the corporate privilege in the United Kingdom, and
clear guidance on its application, would avoid the problems experienced
by corporate clients in the United States. This would create greater
confidence by corporate clients that protected information will not be
disclosed, and eliminate any disincentive to engage in aggressive self-
policing activities. The net results would be a more responsible
corporate culture, and increased compliance with the law.
2. Facilitating Reasonable Government Enforcement
Government investigators in the United Kingdom would also
benefit from a corporate privilege that is clearly defined and consistently
applied. It must be conceded at the outset that there is no reason to
believe that corporate clients, as opposed to individual clients, will use
the privilege as a device to "conceal wrongdoing or cloak advice on
130. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, § 2(a)(4) (2006), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/attomrneyclient-privilege-pr
otection -act 12_6_06_hen06g74_xml.pdf (legislation never introduced).
131. See Silbert, supra note 92, at 1228.
132. Letter from Griffin B. Bell, et al., to Alberto Gonzalez, supra note 96, at 2.
133. See generally Cole, supra note 62.
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evading the law."' 3 4 Clearly recognizing the corporate privilege and
establishing its boundaries would minimize confidentiality disputes, and
foster cooperative relationships between government investigators and
corporations under investigation.
If corporate clients were unsure whether information shared with
their lawyers would be subject to disclosure, they would be hesitant to
provide any assistance to government investigators. Investigators would
be forced to expend significant resources to obtain the information they
need to conduct a thorough investigation. On the other hand, if corporate
clients were secure in the knowledge that privileged information would
be protected, then they would be more likely to provide timely and
thorough cooperation to government investigators.
Though the corporate attorney-client privilege is firmly rooted in
the common law of the United States,' 35 the DOJ's policy of allowing
waiver requests has led to considerable revolt by corporations' 36 and their
attorneys. 137 Forcing corporate cooperation through compelled waiver
has bred contention. It has also led corporate clients to fear the only way
to limit their liability is to turn confidential information over to the
investigators in exchange for leniency.
Consistent application of a corporate legal advice privilege would
avoid the need to resort to compelled waivers. In those instances where
misconduct is uncovered, investigators and corporations under
investigation would know which information is protected and which
information is subject to disclosure. Additionally, it would encourage
timely and thorough cooperation, which would result in more effective,
efficient, and inexpensive investigations.
V. Conclusion
The difficulties experienced by corporations in the United Kingdom
serve as evidence of the need to develop a modern-day legal advice
privilege that provides a workable basis from which lawyers and
corporate clients can interact in confidence. If, as Lord Scott required in
Three Rivers (No. 6), the legal advice privilege is to be given a scope that
reflects the policy reasons that justify its presence in the law of the
United Kingdom, 138 it must be made available to communications
between corporate clients and their lawyers.
134. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, § 2(a)(9).
135. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
136. See AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 84.
137. See ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Recommendation 1I1, supra
note 90.
138. Three Rivers (No. 6), [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] A.C. 610, at 1 35 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
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Justice is served only when all parties to litigation are represented
by experienced and diligent counsel. 3 9 The corporate client is no less
entitled to advice on what should prudently and sensibly be done than are
individual clients. However, the nature of the corporate "person"
requires that additional factors be taken into consideration when crafting
a workable corporate privilege.
The twin policy goals of fostering corporate self-policing, thereby
facilitating compliance with the law, and facilitating reasonable
government enforcement can be accomplished without undermining the
protections of the legal advice privilege. Clearly recognizing a corporate
privilege, and establishing its boundaries would encourage corporations
to create effective compliance programs, as well as allow corporate
clients and their lawyers to interact in confidence. Additionally,
consistent application of the privilege would foster corporate cooperation
and minimize the expense of investigation. In this respect, the United
Kingdom can learn important lessons from the frequently changing and
often inconsistent application of the attorney-client privilege in the
United States.
139. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, § 2(a)(1).
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